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RECENT DECISIONS"

BANKS AND BANKING § 1031. The panic of 1907 resulted in the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913 (38 STAT. 251) which created 12 "bankers' banks" to stabilize the
hational banks. It was compulsory for national banks to join the Federal
Reserve System and optional on the part of state banks. Hiatt v. United States,
4 F. (2d) 374 (C.C.A. 7th, 1924). But a state bank which joined the Federal
Reserve System became subject to federal laws and punishable by the federal
government. Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 47 S.Ct. 629 (1927). During the last few years the trend toward centralization has become more marked.
In 1930 an amendment to the act of 1864 gave national banks many of the privileges heretofore enjoyed only by state banks. City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291
U.S. 262 (1934). And by the act of June 16, 1933, as amended by the act of
August 23, 1935 [12 U.S.C.A. § 64(a) (1936), 48 STAT. 189 (1933), 49 STAT.
708 (1935)] the stockholders of national banks were relieved from the "superadded liability" which is still enforced against state banks in some states. But,
unlike the First United States Bank, the present centralization is not being
forced directly. State banks still have all the powers and rights originally
granted to them, but the national bank status offers additional inducements not
extended to state banks. Then too, a state bank which avails itself of federal
legislation must comply with two sets of laws, is subject to double examination
and reporting, and receives no more advantages than those granted to national
banks. It is not unlikely that many state banks will take advantage of the liberalized branch banking law under which a state bank may affiliate itself with
a national bank and continue operations as a branch of such national bank.
Roy C. PACKLER.

CORPORATIONS-STOCK TRANSFERs-CoNFLIcr OF LAWS AND THE APPLICATION
OF THE UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER Acr.-The defendant, a resident of Minne-

sota, was the owner of a certificate of a beneficiary's interest representing 100
shares in the Standard Oil Shares, Inc., whose transfer agent was located in
New York City. The certificate contained a provision stating that it was transferable to a holder without indorsement. The certificate which was unindorsed
was lost in a public street in a city in Minnesota. On application a duplicate was
issued to the defendant, who furnished a bond on which the plaintiff was surety,
to hold the transfer agent harmless should the original certificate appear. The
lost certificate next appeared in the hands of one H who sold it to the B. Co. of
Chicago through the W. Co. of Minneapolis. B. Co. transferred it, and there were
subsequent transfers until it came into the hands of the H. Co., who presented
it to the transfer agent for transfer to its name on the books of the corporation.
The transfer agent refused to make the transfer, and the certificate was relayed
back from transferor to transferor, in accord with the stock exchange rules,
until it came back into the hands of W. Co., who presented it for transfer. The
transfer agent still refused to make the transfer upon advice from the defendant not to do so. W. Co. threatened to bring suit to compel the transfer on the
corporate books, and the plaintiff surety in order to prevent a lawsuit, which it
would eventually have to defend, and, to which, it believed, it had no defense,
bought the lost certificate. It then brought suit against the defendant for reimbursement. A verdict was directed in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal from an
order denying a new trial, held, brder reversed. A new trial must be had to
determine whether or not W. Co. was a holder in due course of the lost certificate. In the instant case the issue that confronted ihe court was the determination of the title to the lost unindorsied certificate which was in the hands of a
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purchaser as against the one who had lost it and who held a duplicate certificate
representing the same interest. Although no proof was submitted on trial as to
the existence of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act at the situs of the stock at the
time of its transfer or in the state of domicile of the issuing corporation, the
court said that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act had no application because the
certificate being unindorsed did not fall within the terms of the Act, which
requires that any certificate must be indorsed by the person appearing by
the certificate to be the owner. And then, despite the fact that the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act had no application in the instant case, the court mooted the
following propositions which might be stated as follows: Does the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act apply, (a) if it is in force at the situs of the certificate at
the time of its transfer, but not in the state of the domicile of the issuing
corporation; (b) if it is in force in the state of the domicile of the issuing
corporation, but not at the situs of the certificate at the time of its transfer.
American Surety Co. v. Cunningham, (Minn. 1937) 275 N.W. 1.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act [Wis. STATS. (1937) c. 183] does not by
its own terms apply to all certificates. Section 22 of the Act provides: "In the
Act unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires . . . 'certificate'
means a certificate of stock in a corporation organized under the laws of the
state or of another state whose laws are consistent with this Act." It has been
consistently held that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act will not be applied to
certificates of stock in corporations organized in states where such Act has not
been adopted, even if the Act is in force at the situs of the certificates at the
time of their transfer. In Penington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction
Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 170, 156 Atl. 259 (1931), the stock certificates of a corporation organized in Delaware where the Act had not been adopted were transferred in New York where the Act was in effect to a purchaser for value who
had no knowledge of the fact that they were stolen from the owner. The court
held that the title of the certificates was determined by the law of the situs of
the certificates at the time of their transfer, that, although the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act was in effect in New York where the transfer of the stock took
place, it would not apply, since the certificates were not such as were governed
by the Act for the issuing corporation was organized in Delaware where the
Act had not been adopted. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Newburger, 263 N.Y. 16, 188 N.E. 141 (1933), the controversy arose in New York,
which was also the situs of the certificate at the time of its transfer, as to the
title of a stolen certificate representing 100 shares in a Maine corporation. The
New York court held that its own Uniform Stock Transfer Act had no application because the issuing corporation had not been organized in a state which
had laws consistent with the Act. Turnbull v. Longacre Bank, 249 N.Y. 159, 163
N.E. 137 (1928) and Peckinpaugh v. Noble & Co., 238 Mich. 464, 213 N.W. 859
(1927), were decided in states which had adopted the Act. In each case the
contending parties failed to submit proof at the trial as to the law in the
state of the domicile of the issuing corporation, either because of inadvertence
on their part, or because they assumed that the title to the certificates was governed by the Act. On appeal, in each case, the contention was made that the
Act did not govern because it did not appear that the Act was in effect in the
state of the domicile of the issuing corporation, and in each case the court held
that on appeal it was too late to raise that question. It seems, therefore, that the
Act will govern if it is in force at the situs of the certificate at the time of its
transfer, even though the certificate has been issued by a corporation organized in a state which has not adopted the Act, unless proof is submitted on
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trial that the certificate is not such as falls within the terms of the Act. However, in Casto v. Wrenn, 255 Mass. 72, 150 N.E. 898 (1926), the court refused
to apply the Act, because there was no proof offered that the issuing corporation
was organized in a state where the Act was in force, although the Act was in
effect in Massachusetts, the situs of the certificates at the time of their transfer.
Norman v. Bancroft Trust Co., 55 F. (2d) 91 (C.C.A. 1st, 1932), is to the same
effect.
It has been uniformly held that title to certificates of stock is governed by
the law of the situs of the certificates at the time of their transfer. Direction
Der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22, 69 L.ed.
495 (1925). Therefore, if the Act is not in effect at such situs it cannot be
applied even though such Act was in effect in the state of the domicile of the
issuing corporation. However, a recent text writer proposes that if the Act is
in force at the domicile of the issuing corporation, the certificates of the
corporation are entitled to the benefits of the Act wherever they are
negotiated. CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (1929) 118. See also RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 53 (d). There is, however, nothing in the Act that
lends its support to this holding and no case on the point can be found. It is
submitted that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act fails to recognize the needs of
modern business. It seems that the statute should be such as to apply to all
transfers within the state, so that its inhabitants may determine by local law
the validity of transfers made within the state without regard to the law of the
state of issue. It seems harsh, for instance, to require a broker, who takes part,
every day, in many transactions on the stock market involving many corporations of different states, to look to the laws of each state of incorporation to
see if a transfer was effected.
EDWARD J.SoTLOcK.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILIGED CoMmuNIcATioNs-PHYscIAN AND PATIENT-MEDICAL
ASSISTANTS AND DOCTRINE OF AGENcY.-The action was brought by the plaintiff
insurance company to cancel a life insurance policy issued by it on the life of

the deceased insured and payable to the defendant beneficiary. The insured died
a month and three days after the policy was issued and approximately fifteen
months after his admission to the Milwaukee County Hospital. Under the terms
of the policy, it was not to become effective if at the date of issuance the
insured was not in sound health. The plaintiff company contended the insured
deceased was not in sound health as required and, thus, the policy never became
effective. The defendant beneficiary counterclaimed for recovery on the policy.
The trial court, over the objection of the defendant beneficiary, admitted in
evidence the testimony of a nurse in the employ of the hospital, and a medical
case record of the deceased insured kept by the nurse and used by the physician
in treating the patient. Over objection, the trial court also admitted the testimony
of an X-ray operator in the employ of the hospital, and an X-ray plate made by
him at the direction of the physician. The evidence conclusively proved that the
deceased insured had been suffering from an incurable heart ailment at the
time the policy was issued. Subsequently, however, the trial court rejected the

evidence and entered judgment dismissing the complaint and awarding recovery to
the defendant on the counterclaim. The trial court held that all the evidence as
to the deceased insured's unsound health was given or based upon the testimony
of witnesses who were incompetent to testify under a statute disqualifying
a physician from disclosing "any information he may have acquired in attend-;

